Fouche and Talleyrand in Viennese. Vivos voco: a.a. Egorov, "Minister of Napoleonic Police Fouche." Again, closer, the sounds of “Carmagnola” appear.

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Alliance and friendship with England and, if possible, with Austria for the general rebuff of Prussia, the fight against Russia if it supports Prussia - this is the basis on which Talleyrand wished to base the foreign policy and security of France from now on. He was not destined to manage affairs for long during the Restoration period, but as soon as in 1830 the July Revolution gave him the then most important post of French ambassador in London, he, as we will see later, did everything in his power to put his program into practice. The immediate generations of the young French bourgeoisie always regarded very positively the work done by Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna.

And it is not for nothing that Balzac’s hero Vautrin in the novel “Le père Goriot” speaks with such delight about Talleyrand (without naming him): “... the prince - at whom everyone throws a stone and who despises humanity enough to spit into his face as many oaths as he will demand them from him - prevented the division of France at the Congress of Vienna. It should be decorated with wreaths, but they throw dirt at it.” 2
Honoré de Balzac, Le père Goriot, p. 98 (Paris, Ed. Bibliothèque Larousse).
Russian edition: Honore de Balzac, Collection. cit., vol. III. Goslitizdat, 1938

This hotly preached idea that an oathbreaker can “spit” in the face of “humanity” if the end result of his betrayals brings real benefit, brings political capital; This cynical conviction in the primacy of “intellect over morality” in politics is unusually characteristic of the era of the turning point that transferred power into the hands of the bourgeoisie. And what is most characteristic is the solemn, nationwide proclamation of this principle and undisguised admiration for the man in whom this ideal was most fully personified, that is, Prince Talleyrand-Périgord.

Louis XVIII (engraving by Audouin from a drawing by Gros, 1815).

Talleyrand's opponents were most outraged by the fact that he, who at one time so quickly sold the legitimate monarchy, served the revolution, served Napoleon, shot the Duke of Enghien only for his “legitimate” origin, destroyed and trampled under Napoleon with his seven diplomatic formalities and speeches any semblance of an international rights, every concept of “legitimate” or other rights - now with the most serene look, with the clearest forehead he declared (for example, to the Russian delegate at the Vienna Congress, Karl Vasilyevich Nesselrod): “You are talking to me about a deal - I cannot make deals . I am happy that I cannot be as free in my actions as you are. You are guided by your interests, your will: as for me, I am obliged to follow principles, and principles do not enter into transactions” (les principes ne transigent pas). His opponents simply could not believe their ears when they heard that such harsh speeches were being given and impartial morals were being read to them by the same Prince Talleyrand, who - as the already mentioned newspaper “Le Nain jaune” wrote about him around the same time - spent his entire life selling all those who bought it. Neither Nesselrode, nor the Prussian delegate Humboldt, nor Alexander knew that even in those very days of the Congress of Vienna, when Talleyrand gave them harsh lessons in moral behavior, loyalty to principles and religiously steadfast service to legitimism and legality, he received a bribe from the Saxon king five million francs in gold, from the Duke of Baden - one million; They also did not know that later they would all read in Chateaubriand’s memoirs that for his ardent defense in the name of legitimism of the rights of the Neapolitan Bourbons to the throne of the Two Sicilies, Talleyrand then, in Vienna, received from the pretender Ferdinand IV six million (according to other indications, three million seven hundred thousand) and for the convenience of transferring money he was even so kind and helpful that he sent his personal secretary Perret to Ferdinand.

But even here he acted in the matter of taking bribes exactly as under Napoleon. He did not do things for bribes that would go against the interests of France or, more broadly speaking, with the main diplomatic goals that he sought to achieve. But he simultaneously received money from those who were personally interested in seeing that these goals were achieved as quickly and as completely as possible by Talleyrand. So, France, for example, was directly interested in preventing Prussia from seizing the possessions of the Saxon king, and Talleyrand defended Saxony. But since the Saxon king was much more interested in this than France, this king, in order to stimulate the greatest activity in Talleyrand, gave him, for his part, five million. And Talleyrand took them. And, of course, he took it with the restrained and graceful grandeur that was always characteristic of him, with which he once, in 1807, accepted a bribe from this same Saxon king to convince Napoleon not to take the Sistine Madonna and others from the Dresden Gallery, as if it were bad luck paintings that the emperor liked.

The return of Napoleon from the island of Elba and the restoration of the empire took Talleyrand completely by surprise. Recently (in May 1933) Ferdinand Bak's fantasy book “Le secret de Talleyrand” was published in Paris. This “secret”, revealed only by Buck, is that Talleyrand... himself arranged Napoleon’s escape from Elba. I note this amateurish fantasy book here only as a curiosity to prove that distant posterity continues to consider Talleyrand capable of the most amazingly cunning plan and dexterous and strong enough to carry out any such project. Needless to say, there is not even a shadow of scientific argumentation in this book.

Wellington (lithograph by Charles Besnier).

These two people, Talleyrand and Fouche, both former clergy, both accepted the revolution to make a career for themselves, both ministers of the Directory, both ministers of Napoleon, both received the ducal title from Napoleon, both earned a million-dollar fortune under Napoleon, both betrayed Napoleon - and now they also entered together into the office of the “most Christian” and “legitimate” monarch, the brother of the executed Louis. Fouché and Talleyrand already knew each other well and that is why they sought above all to work with each other. Despite the very great similarity of both in the sense of deep contempt for anything other than personal interests, a complete lack of integrity and any restraining principles in the implementation of their plans, they differed from one another in many ways. Fouche was not a very timid man, and before the 9th of Thermidor he boldly put his head on the line, organizing an attack on Robespierre and his overthrow in the Convention. For Talleyrand such behavior would have been completely unthinkable. Fouche, during the era of terror, acted in Lyon in a way that Talleyrand would never have dared to act, who emigrated precisely because he believed that remaining in the camp of “neutrals” was very dangerous in the present, and being an active fighter against the counter-revolution would become dangerous in the future. Fouche had a good head, after Talleyrand - the best that Napoleon ever had. The emperor knew this, showered them both with favors, but then put them in disgrace. That’s why he often remembered them together. For example, after abdicating the throne, he expressed regret that he did not have time to hang Talleyrand and Fouche. “I leave this matter to the Bourbons,” the emperor reportedly added.

However, the Bourbons, willy-nilly, immediately after Waterloo and after their second return to the throne in the summer of 1815, had to not only refrain from hanging both dukes, both Benevento and Otranto, but also call them to rule France. A poet and ideologist of the noble-clerical reaction at that moment, Chateaubriand could not hide his rage at the sight of these two leaders of the revolution and empire, one of whom bore the blood of Louis XVI and many others executed at Lyons, and the other the blood of the Duke of Enghien. Chateaubriand was at court when the lame Talleyrand, arm in arm with Fouche, walked into the king’s office: “Suddenly the door opens; Vice silently enters, supported by Crime - Monsieur Talleyrand, supported by Monsieur Fouche; a hellish vision slowly passes before me, enters the king’s office and disappears there.”

II

The fact is that the sudden return of Napoleon in March 1815, his hundred-day reign and his new overthrow - again carried out not by France, but exclusively by the new invasion of the allied European armies - all these stunning events brought the noble-clerical reaction out of its final equilibrium . They felt severely insulted. How could an unarmed man, in the complete tranquility of the country, land on the southern coast of France and in three weeks, continuously moving towards Paris, without firing a single shot, without shedding a drop of blood, conquer France from its “legitimate” king, drive this king abroad, again sit on the throne and again gather a huge army for war with all of Europe? Who was this man? A despot who did not take off his arms throughout his entire reign, who devastated the country with conscription, a usurper who did not take anyone or anything into account in the world, and most importantly, a monarch, whose new accession would inevitably immediately cause a new, endless war with Europe. And at the feet of this man, without talking, without attempts at resistance, even without attempts at persuasion on his part, in March 1815, all of France, the entire peasantry, the entire army, the entire bourgeoisie immediately fell.

Not a single hand was raised to defend the “legitimate” king, to defend the Bourbon dynasty that returned in 1814. To explain this phenomenon with the fear for the land acquired during the revolution, which the peasantry had, with those fears of the specter of the resurrection of the noble system, which were experienced not only by the peasantry, but also by the bourgeoisie, in general, to explain this amazing incident, these “Hundred Days” in some general and deep way For social reasons, the ultra-royalists were not able to, and simply did not want to. They attributed everything that happened precisely to excessive weakness, compliance, inappropriate liberalism on the part of the king, in the first year of his reign, from April 1814 to March 1815: if only then, they assured, they had managed to mercilessly exterminate sedition - such a general and sudden “treason” would have been impossible in March 1815, and Napoleon would have been captured immediately after his landing at Cape Juan. Now to this shame of the expulsion of the Bourbons in March was added the shame of their return in June, July and August, after Waterloo, and this time really “in the wagons” of the army of Wellington and Blucher. The fury of the ultra-royalists knew no bounds. If the king resisted them a little more and if they still allowed him to resist, then this was only at the first moment: after all, it was necessary to look around, more surprises could be expected.

This is the only reason why a government with Talleyrand and Fouche at its head became possible. But as more and more armies of the British, Prussians, then the Austrians, and later the Russians poured into France, as the enemy armies, this time for many years, were positioned to occupy entire departments and to fully provide Louis XVIII and his dynasty from new attempts by Napoleon, as well as from any revolutionary attempts - the extreme reaction decisively raised its head and screamed about merciless revenge, about the execution of traitors, about the suppression and destruction of everything that was hostile to the old dynasty .

Talleyrand understood where these follies would lead. And he even made some attempts to restrain the frantic. For a long time he resisted the compilation of a proscription list of those who contributed to the return and new accession of Napoleon. These persecutions were nonsense, because all of France either actively contributed or did not resist the emperor and thereby also contributed to him. But then Fute stepped up. Having guillotined or drowned hundreds and hundreds of Lyonnais in the Rhone in 1793 for their adherence to the House of Bourbon, at the same time voting for the death of Louis XVI, for years under Napoleon, as Minister of Police, shooting people accused, again, of adherence to the House of Bourbon - Fouche, again a minister The police, now, in 1815, ardently insisted on new executions, but this time for insufficient commitment to the House of Bourbon. Fouche hastened to compile a list of the most, in his opinion, guilty dignitaries, generals and private individuals, who primarily helped the second accession of Napoleon.

Talleyrand protested strongly. The narrow police mind of Fouche and the furious vindictiveness of the royal court triumphed over the more far-sighted policy of Talleyrand, who understood how much the dynasty was ruining itself, getting dirty in the blood of such people as, for example, the famous Marshal Ney, the legendary brave man, the favorite of the entire army, the hero of the Battle of Borodino. Talleyrand managed to save only forty-three people, the remaining fifty-seven remained on Fouche's list. The execution of Marshal Ney took place and, of course, became the most rewarding topic for anti-Bourbon agitation in the army and throughout the country.

This was just the beginning. A wave of “white terror,” as this movement was then called (for the first time in history), swept across France, especially in the south. The terrible beatings of revolutionaries and Bonapartists, and at the same time also Protestants (Huguenots), incited by the Catholic clergy, irritated Talleyrand, and he tried to enter into a fight with them, but he was not destined to remain in power for long.

Talleyrand. (From a drawing by Filippoto)

The case began with Fouche. No matter how zealous the minister of police was, the ultra-royalists did not want to forgive him for the execution of Louis XVI and his entire past. Fouche resorted to a technique that often helped him under Napoleon: he presented the king and his boss, that is, First Minister Talleyrand, with a report in which he tried to intimidate them with some kind of conspiracies that allegedly existed in the country. But Talleyrand clearly did not believe it and did not even hide it from his colleague. Fouche only seemed to see right through Talleyrand, but Talleyrand actually saw right through the cunning Minister of Police. Talleyrand considered, firstly, the policy of repression and persecution that Fouche wanted to pursue with the sole purpose of pleasing the ultra-royalists and retaining his ministerial portfolio was absurd and dangerous. Secondly, Talleyrand clearly saw that nothing would come of this anyway, that the ultra-royalists hated Fouche too much, covered in the blood of their relatives and friends, and that the office in which the “regicide” Fouche was located could not be durable in the face of complete frantic revelry noble reaction and militant clerical agitation. For all these reasons, the Duke of Benevento decisively wished to get rid of the Duke of Otranto. Quite unexpectedly for himself, Fouche received an appointment as French envoy to Saxony. He left for Dresden. But, having thrown away this ballast, Talleyrand still was not saved from shipwreck. Exactly five days after Fouché’s appointment to Dresden, Talleyrand began a long-prepared principled conversation with the king. He wanted to ask the king for freedom of action to fight against the insane excesses of an extremely reactionary party, which clearly undermined all confidence in the dynasty. He ended his speech with an impressive ultimatum: if His Majesty refuses the ministry his full support “against everyone” against whom it will be needed, then he, Talleyrand, will resign. And suddenly the king gave an unexpected answer to this: “Okay, I will appoint another ministry.” This happened on September 24, 1815, and this ended Prince Talleyrand’s career for fifteen years.

For the minister who was so suddenly dismissed, this was a complete surprise, contrary to everything that he writes in his memoirs, giving his resignation the appearance of some kind of patriotic feat and connecting it, for no apparent reason, with France’s relations with its victors. That was not the point, and Talleyrand, of course, understood better than anyone what the root of events was. Louis XVIII, old, sick, immobile and gouty, wanted only one thing: not to go into exile for the third time, to die peacefully as a king and in the royal palace. He was so smart that he understood the correctness of Talleyrand's views and the danger to the dynasty of the white terror and the insane cries and acts of the ultra-reactionary party. But he had to take this party into account at least enough so as not to irritate it with collaborators like Fouche or Talleyrand.

Street fighting in Paris during the revolution of 1830 (Lithograph by Victor Adam)

Freed from the ministry, Talleyrand began to work closely on an operation he had long thought out, about which no one knew until recent years, more precisely until December 15, 1933, when some secret documents were published in France. On January 12, 1817, Prince Talleyrand, it turns out, wrote a most secret letter to Metternich, Chancellor of the Austrian Empire. He reported that he “carried away” (emporté) from the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs some of Napoleon’s original correspondence, starting with the conqueror’s return from Egypt and ending with 1813. So, would you like to buy it?

A correspondence began between the seller and the buyer. Talleyrand wrote that Russia, or Prussia, or England would give half a million francs in gold, but he, Talleyrand, loves Austria and, in particular, Metternich. The goods are first-class: “twelve voluminous bags”, Napoleon’s own signatures! And most importantly, Emperor Franz should not skimp because there are things there that are unpleasant for Austria, and, having bought the documents, the Austrian government, as Talleyrand advises, “could either bury them in the depths of their archives or even destroy them.” The deal took place, and Talleyrand sold these archival documents that he personally stole for half a million. He stole them in advance, in 1814 and 1815, when he briefly visited twice at the head of the government.

But, realizing quite clearly that he was committing real high treason, coupled with direct criminality, theft of state property, Prince Talleyrand prudently demands from Metternich that he, Talleyrand, be provided with shelter in Austria if, for example, some kind of crime befalls him in France. some trouble and he will have to leave his fatherland without loss of time.

Metternich agreed to everything and paid for everything in full. And only later, when all this stolen property was taken out of France (under the guise of Austrian embassy papers that were not subject to inspection) and arrived in Vienna, the Austrian chancellor could be convinced that the seller had partly deceived him too: many of the documents turned out to be not originals at all, but copies, without Napoleon's signature. But in such delicate cases, who will you complain to? The concealer and buyer always runs the risk of suffering if the thief and dealer is prone to deceit. That was the end of the matter.

“You are always Austrian!” - “Partly, Your Majesty, but it would be more correct to say that I am never Russian and always remain French.” This exchange between Napoleon and Talleyrand took place in September 1808, on the eve of the meeting of the two emperors in Erfurt.

In a few words - a whole diplomatic program. Yes, the former minister had not been committed to Russian-French cooperation all his life. But he defended the interests of Austria so devotedly, not stopping at prohibited means, that he aroused the joy and even delight of Clemens Metternich, the Austrian ambassador in Paris from August 1806 to May 1809.

Metternich and Talleyrand were worthy allies of each other, although much separated them; the French diplomat lived and acted in an environment generated by the turbulent years of 1789 and 1793, the regimes of the Directory and the Empire. While remaining an aristocrat, he was in the service of a new powerful force - capital, to which he obsequiously and devotedly bowed his back.

Prince Benevento created bourgeois diplomacy with all its features, new tasks, forms, methods generated by the needs of the era. And Metternich served the absolutist Austrian monarchy, following the classical recipes of diplomacy of the past, and above all the experience of his father.

And at the same time, Talleyrand and Metternich had many common features: recognition of the sanctity of the privilege of the ruling classes; exorbitant ambition and insatiable desire for luxury; adherence to the principle “the end justifies the means”; the ability to use women in political struggle. Napoleon called Metternich "the greatest liar of the century."

In the famous portrait of Metternich, a friendly smile seems to be glued to his narrow, long face with a large, irregularly shaped nose and small lips. The eyes look to the side, into the distance, into the future. The right hand rests on the arm of the chair, the left - according to the strong tradition of those times - holds a state paper folded in half. The whole figure breathes arrogance, unshakable self-confidence, a sense of personal superiority. This is how the Austrian prince arrived in Paris.

The very next day after Metternich’s arrival, on August 5, 1806, his first meeting with Talleyrand took place, which, according to the Austrian ambassador, took place in an atmosphere of “deep cordiality” and showed the French diplomat’s readiness to create a “system of close relations” between France and Austria. Soon the cooperation went far beyond official contacts between the minister and the ambassador and became a friendly, trusting alliance. This rapprochement took on new forms after the meeting in Tilsit and the resignation of Talleyrand. It was then that the line between duty and high treason became blurred for him.

Metternich saw changes in the mood of Parisian society and believed that at the head of the “peace party,” that is, the majority of the nation, which condemned the imperial policy of conquest, but “inert and inflexible, like an extinct volcano,” stood Talleyrand, Fouche, the owners of fortunes who sought their preserved, people who did not believe in the stability of institutions built on ruins, which “the restless genius of the emperor replenished with new ruins.” The Austrian closely followed the development of internal political events in France, fully aware that they could lead to a weakening of the Napoleonic regime and significant changes in the European arena. “This party has existed since 1805. The war of 1806 and 1807 strengthened its capabilities. The failure of the campaign against Spain in 1808 made the party leaders and their arguments popular."

However, in general these estimates are exaggerated. Metternich really wanted to see anti-Bonapartists capable of at least raising their voices against the powerful emperor. But his desires were far from reality. The ex-minister joined conspiracies only if their victory was ensured or had already become a fait accompli. And no other way! He valued his head too much. And Talleyrand led a secret war against the emperor, becoming Metternich’s friend, adviser, and informant. Metternich initially looked at his ally with caution.

“People like Talleyrand are like cutting instruments that are dangerous to play with; but for large wounds strong medicines are needed, and the person entrusted with their treatment should not be afraid to use the instrument that cuts in the best way,” wrote the Austrian diplomat who managed to take this dangerous man into his hands.

According to Metternich, during his diplomatic mission in Paris, he talked with Talleyrand no less than 20 times and he invariably believed that “the interests of France itself require that the powers capable of repelling Napoleon unite in order to put a barrier to his insatiable ambition; Napoleon's cause is no longer the cause of France; Europe can finally be saved only through the closest possible union of Austria and Russia." The emperor's former minister called for the unity of his enemies! He accused the ruler of the depravity of his aspirations. To whom were such confessions made? A representative of a power with which the French army has repeatedly fought in the past and will fight again in the near future. Any legislation has always considered such behavior of an official, even a former one, as criminal.

How far did Charles Maurice go in his frank confessions to Metternich! “You will never find anyone more dedicated to your cause than me,” he said. And the ambassador, with good reason, informed Johann Stadion, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that Talleyrand had made “devotion to the Austrian court his profession.” At first it took the form of advice, recommendations, information about Napoleon’s actions and his diplomacy. So, at the beginning of 1806, Prince Benevent informed Metternich that the emperor was hatching two projects: the division of Turkey (the plan is real!) and an expedition to East India (something like a novel!). But Austria needs to take part in both actions. “On the same day they must enter

Constantinople, French, Austrians and Russians." The ambassador trusted his interlocutor. He wrote: “It seemed to me more than likely that the data reported by Talleyrand fully corresponded to the views of the emperor.” Of course, in Vienna such unusual information from Paris met with the most serious and attentive attention and provided rich food for thought and conclusions.

An unusual situation arose: the retired minister maintained constant contacts with official foreign representatives accredited to the French Emperor. The Russian ambassador Count P. A. Tolstoy reported on December 27, 1807 to St. Petersburg that he, together with Metternich, consulted “many times” with Talleyrand, whom he even called “the apostle of peace.” The “Apostle”, in conversations with ambassadors, openly, for example, condemned Napoleon’s anti-English statements. At the same time, the very nature of diplomatic ties was unusual. On the one hand, Russian and French diplomats, representing states bound by the Tilsit Agreements and standing on the eve of the meeting in Erfurt, met and exchanged opinions, and, on the other hand, the Austrian prince, whose country soon again entered the war with France and Russia.

Talleyrand was not stopped by the real possibility of a new outbreak of imperial anger. Napoleon was wary of the ex-minister's close ties with the Russian ambassador. “This Tolstoy is imbued with all the ideas of the Faubourg Saint-Germain and all the pre-Topland prejudices of the old Petersburg court. In France he sees only ambition and in the depths of his soul mourns the change in Russia's political line, especially the change in relation to England. Perhaps he is a very secular person, but his stupidity makes me feel sorry for Morkov. With that it was possible to accelerate; he understood things. And this one is just shy.”9 What an amazing picture: Napoleon in a conversation with Caulaincourt, with a kind word remembering A.I. Morkov, whose recall he himself demanded. Before this, difficulties in Russian-French relations were complicated by the actions of S. A. Kolychev. And finally, P. A. Tolstoy, who did not approve of the alliance with France, came to the French capital.

Thus, for many years, dignitary St. Petersburg sent officials to Paris who were deeply hostile to the country with which the diplomatic service was obliged to strengthen relations. There can only be one explanation. Somewhere in the soul and mind of the tsar and his closest collaborators there always lived hatred of the French Revolution and chilling memories of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette executed by the people, although the Jacobin dictatorship had already become a part of history and a monarchical regime existed in France.

General Pyotr Aleksandrovich Tolstoy, a professional military man, a participant in the military operations of the Russian army against the French, was truly hostile to the Tsar’s Tilsit policy. The offer to go to Paris found him at his ancestral estate and almost led him to despair. The Count had to endure a family revolution. His wife begged him on her knees not to go to the “enemy of the human race.” But Alexander I insisted, emphasizing that under Napoleon he did not need a diplomat, but a “brave and devoted military man.” Tolstoy reluctantly agreed. “The strengthening of the Tilsit agreement was entrusted to an inept diplomat hostile to the new political system,” writes N.K. Schilder, famous Russian historian. And he notes: “Metternich was slow to immediately appreciate the Russian ambassador.” Talleyrand also turned out to be perspicacious, rarely making mistakes in his assessment of the people he encountered. Thus a kind of anti-Bonapartist alliance was formed between the former minister and two influential foreign ambassadors.

The ancient city of Erfurt on the Gera River (now the territory of the GDR) belonged to Prussia, but after its military defeat it became Napoleon's military spoil. Erfurt was not at all prepared for the role of a world capital. The winding, poorly paved streets were not lit in the evenings. Small, narrow houses with beautiful stucco facades were completely unsuitable for eminent persons. The population was also frightened by the invasion of the soldiers of Marshal Charles Nicolas Oudinot, and then an entire army of officials and workers. But soon a lot changed. The furniture in the princely palace was replaced, statues, paintings, vases, and tapestries were brought; the new wallpaper lit up with Napoleonic eagles and bees. The gilded court theater, previously used as a barn, sparkled. Many houses became like palaces. All apartments were overcrowded. Rooms in 20 city hotels were literally occupied with a fight.

Still would! A stream of kings, dukes, princes, senior government officials, marshals and generals, and diplomats poured into a small Prussian town where a meeting was being prepared between the two most powerful people in Europe. One of them, Napoleon, especially needed it. The defeats of French troops in Spain undermined its prestige and weakened France's international position. In Vienna they perked up and began to frantically arm themselves. Under such conditions, a new demonstration of the strength of the Franco-Russian alliance acquired special significance for Napoleon. In the name of this goal, he spared neither time nor money.

But why did the emperor invite his former minister to Erfurt, about whose front he could not help but know? The court did not yet have materials for serious accusations against Talleyrand. Napoleon knew about his meetings with foreign diplomats in Paris and, to a certain extent, sanctioned them. Thus, Prince Benevento received official cover, which he deftly used to criticize imperial policy. Moreover, Talleyrand remained a great chamberlain, and he performed his duties superbly. Napoleon's plan was realized. Erfurt turned into a city of endless celebrations, shows and balls. The power of the French ruler received another visible confirmation.

But the main ones for Napoleon were, of course, political considerations. He appreciated Talleyrand's experience, his ability to prepare and edit the most important documents, and his inherent art of diplomatic maneuvering. In addition, the ex-minister participated in the Tilsit meeting, personally knew the tsar and his entourage, and was on friendly terms with the ambassador in St. Petersburg, Caulaincourt. Talleyrand got acquainted with his correspondence on behalf of the emperor. Now he was aware of all matters and could act in accordance with the situation.

The most important place at the meeting in Erfurt (September 27-October 14, 1808) was occupied by the Austrian question. Napoleon's goal was to intimidate Austria and achieve its disarmament. The tsar's position was fundamentally different. Before leaving for the Hanseatic city, he promised his mother Maria Feodorovna to “save Austria.” And the discussion on the Austrian problem took place in a tense atmosphere. Without receiving concessions, Napoleon lost his composure. There was a moment when he threw his hat on the floor and stamped on it furiously with his feet. Alexander looked at him with a smile, was silent and then calmly said: “You are harsh, but I am stubborn: with me you will not achieve anything with anger. Let's talk or reason. Otherwise I'm leaving." And he headed towards the doors.

The Tsar did not want the disarmament of Austria and made only a verbal promise to promote the recognition of the “new order of things” in Spain by the Austrian court. “All the courtesy, all the proposals and all the impulses of Napoleon remained fruitless; Before leaving Erfurt, Emperor Alexander wrote a handwritten letter to the Austrian Emperor, in which he reassured him about the fears instilled in him by the Erfurt meeting. This was the last service I rendered to Europe under Napoleon, and, in my opinion, it was a service to him personally,” Talleyrand wrote in his Memoirs.

A favor to Europe? A favor for Napoleon personally? What did the former Minister of Foreign Relations mean? He was heading to Erfurt with the firm intention of supporting Austria against Napoleonic machinations. Talleyrand hoped first of all to influence the king, using both his personal acquaintance with him and the assistance of Caulaincourt, with whom he maintained friendly and trusting relations. And the French ambassador was courted in St. Petersburg. He was a regular participant in court balls, ceremonies, receptions, and intimate evenings. Caulaincourt gave military advice to the king. He even refused to accept a French intelligence agent. Napoleon was furious and sharply told his representative: “You are in Russia, and remain French in it.” He even claimed that Caulaincourt was “more a courtier of Emperor Alexander than an ambassador of France.” But Napoleon did not want to change his representative for a long time. Valuable information came from him, primarily military.

Beginning in December 1807, when Caulaincourt began performing his duties in the Russian capital, Talleyrand constantly corresponded with him. But on the main issues, the positions of the two diplomats were close. Both of them believed that the emperor should abandon his conquests and return the country to its natural borders. However, politics was not the only area in which like-minded people found a common language. They also united in solving one personal issue that was vitally important for Caulaincourt. He long and devotedly loved Adrienne de Canisi, a representative of an old noble family from Normandy, who was married off at the age of 13. She reciprocated. The lovers dreamed of starting their own family. But the emperor, who at that time was thinking about divorce himself, did not want a divorced woman to be at his court. This was far from the first case of autocratic tyranny. However, at Talleyrand's request, Napoleon received de Canisy twice. There was hope for a successful resolution of her family affairs. Caulaincourt was happy and thanked Charles Maurice. They met as friends in Erfurt.

Talleyrand told Metternich about “his limitless influence” on Caulaincourt. Apparently, there was some truth in these words. At the very least, the ambassador contributed to the rapprochement of the former minister with P. A. Tolstoy and, most importantly, his meetings with the tsar. According to Talleyrand, Caulaincourt “inspired Emperor Alexander’s confidence in himself and made him trust me too.” In Erfurt, Prince Beneventskin saw the Tsar almost every day, after each performance, at the home of Princess Thurn and Taxis. It was here that he declared (all historians refer to only one source - the memoirs of K. Metternich) to the Russian autocrat: “Sir, why did you come here? You must save Europe, and you will achieve this only by repelling Napoleon." Talleyrand criticized his policy, emphasizing that “the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees are the conquests of France, the rest are the conquests of the emperor.” It was the same idea about the natural borders of the French state, excluding any, even minor, expansion of its territory at the expense of other countries.

Is it possible to talk about Talleyrand's treason? Yes, definitely. As Napoleon's confidant at the meeting in Erfurt, he called on the allied power to fight France. It is not difficult to imagine the tsar’s surprise when he heard seditious speeches from the lips of one of the people closest to Napoleon - Talleyrand, who headed the French diplomatic service for eight years and came to the Prussian town with the aim of strengthening cooperation between the two empires. Something strange was happening in the French state! Clear cracks appeared in its foundation. Only one conclusion suggested itself: the tsar must take tough positions and not yield to the French emperor.

According to the opinion widespread in historical literature, Talleyrand determined the positions of Alexander I and his entourage in negotiations with Napoleon. This is undoubtedly an exaggeration. Even before the revelations of the great chamberlain, Russian diplomacy had no intention of handing over Austria to be torn to pieces by Napoleonic marshals. The security of the Russian state required the preservation and strengthening of Austria. Talleyrand's behavior only strengthened the king in the opinion that he had formed earlier, before the Erfurt meeting.

Talleyrand defended Austrian interests with the devotion of a loyal servant of Franz I. He regularly discussed his actions with the unofficial representative of Austria in Erfurt, General Karl Vincent. The discussion was primarily about the draft Russian-French convention prepared by Talleyrand, to which Napoleon made two fundamental amendments. One of them gave the French emperor the right to be a judge in the matter of Russia’s declaration of war on Austria, the other provided for the deployment of a Russian corps in the area of the Austrian border. The Prince of Benevento persuaded the tsar to remove from the text “everything that concerns Austria.” Caulaincourt also insisted on this. As a result, Napoleon's amendments did not see the light of day. “Reporting” to Metternich in Paris on the results of the meeting in Erfurt, Talleyrand said that since the battle of Austerlitz, Russia’s relations with Austria had never been “more favorable,” and in St. Petersburg Caulaincourt, “completely devoted to my political point of view (the ex-minister) ", will support all the demarches of the Austrian ambassador, aimed at restoring close Russian-Austrian relations. By supporting the Viennese court, Talleyrand provoked a new war between Austria and France. Soon this happened.

In Erfurt, Napoleon decided to divorce Josephine and instructed Talleyrand to talk with the Tsar about the possibility of marrying one of the Russian Grand Duchesses. “I confess that the new ties between France and Russia seemed to me dangerous for Europe. In my opinion, it was necessary to achieve only recognition of the idea of \u200b\u200bthis marriage alliance in order to satisfy Napoleon, but at the same time introduce such reservations that would complicate its implementation. All the art that I considered necessary to use turned out to be unnecessary with Emperor Alexander. He understood me from the very first word and understood me exactly as I wanted,” Talleyrand wrote.

The king asked for a delay in the answer. Then a second delay - for ten days. It was about the hand of Anna, who was barely 14 years old. They asked for the opinion of her elder sister, Grand Duchess Ekaterina Pavlovna. She agreed, but considered Anna's age a big obstacle. Then in St. Petersburg they began to exile the Empress Mother, who did not give a definite answer. And in conclusion, Alexander’s polite but final refusal followed.

Talleyrand claimed that he fell into disgrace with Napoleon as a result of his opposition to his marriage to the Russian Grand Duchess. Pure fiction! Napoleon knew nothing of the duplicitous behavior of his “confidant” in Erfurt. Quite a long time passed after this. At the beginning of January 1810, in a conversation with the emperor, Talleyrand energetically pushed him towards an Austrian marriage. On January 28, at an emergency council in the Tuileries, Talleyrand energetically supported the official speaker he had inspired, arguing that Napoleon’s marriage to the cousin-granddaughter of Marie Antoinette, who laid her head on the guillotine, would justify France in the eyes of Europe and would contribute to the creation of a Franco-Austrian union.

The Tsar appreciated the frank statements of the great chamberlain, which could have cost him his head if Napoleon had found out about them. Together with his Minister of Foreign Affairs N.P. Rumyantsev, Alexander considered Talleyrand to be one of the people who enjoyed his complete confidence. Prince Beneventsky established friendly relations with Rumyantsev, who arrived in Paris in October 1808 for peace negotiations with representatives of the English government. In London, the Russian initiative was not supported. However, Rumyantsev was in the French capital for more than three and a half months. He informed the Tsar that he was “very pleased with the confidence” that Talleyrand, the only person in Paris with whom he was closely associated, had shown him.

Of course, Russia and France were allied powers. But the information exchanged between the two ministers - former and current - went far beyond the scope of official diplomatic relations and was essentially hostile to Napoleon. In great secrecy, Talleyrand introduced Rumyantsev to the alarming letters of General Gerard Duroc from Spain and noted that Napoleon in this country still had to “overcome enormous difficulties.” His sister, the Duchess of Tuscany, painted the position of the French Emperor in gloomy tones, talking about anti-French protests in Italy. The Grand Chamberlain showed the Russian minister the pamphlet of Pedro Cevallos, hostile to Naloleon, which he had received from Fouche. Thus, the coloring of the information conveyed by Talleyrand to Rumyantsev did not raise any doubts: it was sharply anti-Bonapartist.

Talleyrand was interested in Austrian affairs. And he knew well that they were the subject of Rumyantsev’s conversations with Napoleon. He attacked the Austrians, demanded their disarmament, threateningly declared: “Austria wants a slap in the face, I will give it on both cheeks”; “I will beat Austria with molasses.” The emperor “several times made it clear that he should be inclined to war with Austria,” Rumyantsev reported to Alexander I. Need I say how interesting such information received from Talleyrand was for Metternich?

And not only for the Austrian ambassador. This information undoubtedly became known to both Talleyrand and the Minister of Police Joseph Fouche. “At present they have the same goals and means of achieving them,” Metternich reported to Vienna on December 4, 1808. He believed that Talleyrand needed the “active assistance” of Fouche, and the latter was attracted to the prince’s political concepts. The rapprochement of two statesmen who had not even spoken to each other for a long time was a real sensation. This was an expression of serious anti-Bonapartist shifts in the circles of the big bourgeoisie and the new aristocracy, frightened by the adventurism of the “Corsican”, whose unattainable dream was world domination.

It is generally accepted that Talleyrand and Fouche stood at two extreme poles, representing, in the words of Dafa Cooper, “a remarkable contrast.” This is an exaggeration, although the differences were undoubtedly significant. Charles Maurice was born into a family of hereditary nobles, Joseph into a family of merchants and sailors. The first became a bishop and, if desired, could receive a cardinal's hat; the second achieved a modest position in the Oratorian congregation, which was engaged in Catholic education in France, as a monastic teacher, teacher of mathematics and physics. Talleyrand was personable, refined, and polite. His numerous love stories, often exaggerated and exaggerated by rumor, earned him a reputation as a favorite of the fair sex. The surrounding fouchés saw him differently. Thin, almost ethereal, with sharp features of a narrow, bony face and cold eyes, as a rule, casually dressed, he made an unpleasant, repulsive impression. But he had the virtues of a faithful husband to an ugly woman and a tender father. During the years of the revolution, the former Bishop of Autun was engaged in pure politics and made money. He didn't get blood on his hands. But the former Oratorian teacher first voted for the execution of Louis XVI, and then mercilessly shot from cannons and sent the rebel citizens of Lyon to the guillotine so that they, as they said in those days, “threw their heads into baskets.”

The differences between two people are considerable! But many things brought them together. Both became millionaires and representatives of the new, Napoleonic aristocracy: one was the Prince of Benevento, the other was the Duke of Otranto. Both occupied the most important ministerial posts and other government positions and became part of the emperor’s inner circle. Both Talleyrand and Fouche valued money and real power above all else. For this purpose, they mastered the humiliating art of uncomplainingly adapting to the tastes, views and intentions of the dictator, indifferent and boundless patience, and learned to silently endure the grossest insults. The enemies-friends were outstanding directors and actors of political plays. About one of them, Napoleon said: “Intrigue was as necessary to Fouche as food: he intrigued always, everywhere, in all ways and with everyone.” Don't these words also apply entirely to Talleyrand?

On December 20, 1808, “all Paris” was crowded at a large reception at Talleyrand’s in the Matignon mansion on the Rue Varennes. Everything, as usual, went according to a predetermined order. Suddenly he was unexpectedly disturbed. The looks of those present turned in surprise to the belated guest: it was Fouche. The owner of the house hastily rushed to him, grabbed him by the arm (“a vice based on a crime,” let us remember the words of Chateaubriand), and they walked for a long time through the salons, talking animatedly. Talleyrand and Fouche have made peace! Something serious is being prepared against the emperor - this was the general opinion. “When such a sudden friendship breaks out between a cat and a dog, it means it is directed against the cook,” noted Stefan Zweig.

Yes, of course, the friendship of the rivals was “directed against the cook.” It was not about a conspiracy, a coup d'état with its traditional scenario: secret movements of soldiers, night shots, exile of unwanted persons to remote and unhealthy places. Talleyrand and Fouche were too cautious (to the point of cowardice) and selfish (to the point of self-adoration) people. Metternich also had a kindred spirit. The Austrian diplomat perfectly understood his like-minded people and therefore wrote: “They are in the position of passengers who, seeing the handle of the steering wheel in the hands of an extravagant helmsman, capable of capsizing the ship on reefs that he finds without any need, are then ready to take the reins of power into their own hands.” , when the threat to their own salvation will be greater than before, and at that moment, finally, when the first blow on the ship will overthrow the helmsman himself.” It is said aptly and precisely!

True, the friends were not waiting for the “fall of the helmsman,” but for his possible death in Spain, where Napoleon left on October 29, ten days after returning from Erfurt. Didn’t his marshals and generals die on the battlefield? It is enough to recall the names of Sulkowski and Muiron, Joubert and Deze. During the people's war, the emperor could have been ambushed not only by a stray bullet, but also by the knife of a Spanish patriot. One had to think seriously and in a timely manner about inheriting power (in other words, about one's own safety, one's destiny and one's income).

Were Talleyrand and Fouché looking for allies? It seemed that they had considerable opportunities for this. The crisis of the regime gave rise to numerous fronts. Even such people close to Napoleon, such as his friend from his youth, permanent naval minister Denis Decret, and marshals Jean Jourdan and Jean Lannes, expressed their dissatisfaction and anxiety in a narrow circle. But the choice fell on Joachim Murat. Fouché maintained friendly relations with him. Talleyrand hoped to exploit the weaknesses of Murat and his wife Caroline, Bonaparte's sister: their exorbitant vanity, insatiable thirst for power and money.

Murat's task was to leave for Paris at the first signal. But the letter sent to him by Talleyrand fell into the hands of Eugene Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy, son of Josephine. He was warned by the head of the postal department, Antoine Lavalette, formerly one of Napoleon’s adjutants, married to his niece (a happy marriage: in 1815, after “one hundred days,” she saved the life of her husband, who was sentenced to death; he escaped from prison in her clothes). Madrid received alarming information from Archchancellor Cambasares and even from the Mother Empress.

External difficulties were added to internal difficulties. The King of Bavaria informed the French new data about the armament of Austria and the mobilization of the Landswehr. The Austrian Empire was rapidly preparing for war. Under such conditions, Napoleon unexpectedly decided to return to Paris.

On January 16, 1809, the emperor left Valladolid and already on January 23 at 8 o'clock in the morning he arrived in the Tuileries. A cannon shot at the Les Invalides notified the Parisians of his arrival. Soon palace life seemed to have returned to its usual routine, and there was no sign of a storm. But the storm broke out.

On Saturday, January 28, Napoleon convened the three highest dignitaries of the Empire - Cabazares, Lebrun, Talleyrand and two ministers - Fouche and Decre. At first, he said that those around him should be the spokesmen of his thoughts and intentions (betrayal occurs already at the moment when they begin to doubt anything!), and then he unleashed a stream of rude curses on Talleyrand.

“You are a thief, a scoundrel, a man without faith, you. don't believe in God; you have not fulfilled your duty all your life, you have betrayed, deceived everyone; nothing is sacred to you, you would sell your father.” Talleyrand stood silently, motionless, leaning on his elbows, sparing his sore leg. A deathly pallor covered his cheeks. And the emperor accused him of provoking the war in Spain, of the tragic fate of the Duke of Enghien. "What are your plans? What do you want? What are you hoping for? Dare to say it! You deserve to be broken like a glass by me! I am able to do this, but I despise you too much to bother,” Napoleon’s irritated voice thundered. Silently, Prince Beneventsky slowly walked towards the exit. They claimed that he quietly muttered only one phrase through his teeth: “What a pity that such a great man was brought up so poorly.” They expected Talleyrand's arrest or exile. Nothing of the sort happened. For some inexplicable reasons, the emperor spared his former minister. He only stripped him of the title of Grand Chamberlain. But the revenge of the offended aristocrat was immeasurably more insidious and dangerous.

Talleyrand became a paid Austrian agent. Already on January 29, he visited Metternich and told him that he “considered it his duty to enter into direct relations with Austria.” The former minister bluntly raised the issue of spy salaries. The Austrian ambassador immediately turned to Vienna with a request to send him 300-400 thousand francs. “No matter how large this sum may seem, it is significantly less than the sacrifices to which we are accustomed, and the results of its use can be enormous,” wrote Metternich.

In Vienna, the information from Paris gave the impression of a bomb exploding. True, Talleyrand has been paid here more than once - and widely -. But he had never before been seen in the pathetic role of a permanent full-time spy. This was something new! Just in case, they initially decided to pay only 100 thousand francs, but at the same time they said that the servant was given carte blanche and should not hesitate to spend, “if we are talking about real, significant services, and not empty promises.” It soon became clear that the services cost money, and a lot of it.

On February 1, Talleyrand informed Metternich that General Oudinot had received orders to march with his troops in the direction of Augsburg and Ingolstadt. He advised the Austrians to prepare for war and, most importantly, “not to waste time,” since “any illusion would be criminal.” In March, from the same source, Metternich received the latest dislocation of the French army, a detailed description of the state of all its units, other, very accurate military data, reports from Caulaincourt from St. Petersburg and Andreossi from Vienna. At the same time, the employer and his paid agent agreed that in the event of a Franco-Austrian war they would use Frankfurt, where the prince-primate (the highest political and religious office) Karl Dahlberg ruled, for communication.

This time the war with Austria brought many surprises to Napoleon. After it began, in April 1809, the Austrians won a number of victories, occupied Munich and Regensburg, and defeated the French army in May near Aspern and Essling. However, the outcome of the war was decided in favor of France in July as a result of the famous Battle of Wagram.

On October 14, a peace treaty was signed in Vienna, according to which Austria lost its southwestern and eastern provinces, paid an indemnity of 85 million francs and reduced its army to 150 thousand people. The treaty also applied to Russia as an ally of France.

But relations between the allies left much to be desired. They were going through another crisis. The Tsar and his entourage did not want to conduct active offensive operations against the Austrians. Army of General S. f. Golitsyna slowly moved through the territory of Galicia. Napoleon was outraged by such tactics, the meaning of which he understood perfectly. But Alexander I believed that it was irritation. in Paris is better than “if we were too eager to help destroy Austria.” The strengthening of the Napoleonic Empire worried the Minister of War M. B. Barclay de Tolly and A. N. Saltykov, a fellow Minister of Foreign Affairs. Among the nobility, senior military leaders and officials, and other layers of Russian society, dissatisfaction with the alliance with Napoleon was growing.

But there was another movement that considered maintaining cooperation with France “for the time being beneficial and necessary for the peace of the empire” (words of A. B. Kurakin, who replaced P. A. Tolstoy as Russian ambassador in Paris in November 1808). The same views were held by the Minister of Foreign Affairs N.P. Rumyantsev, a famous reformer, confidant and advisor of Alexander I, M.M. Speransky, who had a great influence on foreign policy affairs. They maintained a trusting relationship with Talleyrand. “Everything that you, Prince, write to me about the Emperor is very good. We often talk about you in our conversations. He highly values your talents and believes that it would be very useful to use them,” said Rumyantsev’s letter dated June 14, 1809.

And Russian diplomats used the “talents” of the former Minister of Foreign Relations with considerable benefit for themselves: on different problems, at different times. Particular attention was paid to Austrian affairs. They were of great interest to both sides. “The Prince of Benevento does not think that the overthrow of the Austrian state is consistent with the interests of France itself. He considers it necessary to preserve it, to allow it to develop its strength and prestige,” reported A. B. Kurakin. This opinion after the Battle of Wagram (letter dated August 16, 1809) was shared by Kurakin, reflecting the mood that existed in St. Petersburg.

Talleyrand maintained contacts not only with the Tsar’s ambassador in Paris, but also with other Russian representatives, including the captain (captain, who soon became a colonel) A.I. Chernyshev, Alexander’s favorite and confidant. He was a young, energetic, brave and handsome officer (in Paris, ladies admired his “wasp waist” and “Chinese eyes”). He acted as a messenger for two emperors and often scurried between Paris and St. Petersburg. During 1809 alone, Chernyshev went to Napoleon four times. He traveled from Bayonne and back, from end to end of Europe, with fantastic speed for those times - in 34 days. At the Battle of Wagram, the royal messenger did not leave Napoleon, who showered him with favors.

The doors of all aristocratic houses in Paris swung open to the Russian officer. And this was a clever and experienced intelligence officer. He had his own agents in the War Ministry and with their help received and sent to St. Petersburg detailed information about the location of the troops of France and its allies. “A skilled man,” as N.P. Rumyantsev wrote about Chernyshev, for a number of years sent the most valuable information about French weapons, considering a new war between Russia and France inevitable. The colonel became especially active in 1811. The French managed, however, although with great difficulty, to uncover the secret connections of the Russian intelligence officer in Paris. In February 1812, he left France and took an active part in the war with Napoleon, and subsequently became a prince, adjutant general and minister of war.

But all these metamorphoses will happen to Chernyshev much later. And in 1810, a young Russian officer arrived to Talleyrand with a letter of recommendation from Caulaincourt. He was treated kindly. He often visited the house of the former minister, dined with him and Berthier (Prince of Neuchâtel), who was directly related to military affairs. Of course, current political issues were discussed. In his reports to St. Petersburg, Chernyshev paid special attention to two main pieces of advice given to him by the Duke of Benevento: bringing Russia closer to Austria and ending the war with Turkey, which began at the end of 1806.

Talleyrand developed his views in detail in confidential conversations with Karl Vasilyevich Nesselrode, who came to Paris as an adviser to the Russian embassy in March 1810 (he later served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chancellor). The new adviser came to Talleyrand and told him: “I arrived from St. Petersburg; Officially I am a member of Prince Kurakin, but I am accredited with you. I am in private correspondence with the emperor and have brought you a letter from him.”

So Prince Beneventsky became an adviser and informant to the tsar through K.V. Nesselrode and M.M. Speransky. This connection was given great importance in St. Petersburg and was kept in such strict secrecy that even Ambassador A. B. Kurakin and Minister N. P. Rumyantsev did not know about its existence.

Soon after his arrival in Paris, Nesselrode sent an important document from the imperial chancellery to St. Petersburg - a note on French policy towards Russia and asked to use it “with extreme caution, since if Caulaincourt had received the slightest information about it, two people would have been shot and this most precious the source would dry up forever.” Nesselrode paid his informants generously. He asked to transfer him an additional 30-40 thousand francs through the Lafitte and Perego banks. The latter enjoyed special confidence throughout business Paris, since his daughter was married to Marshal Auguste Marmont, Duke of Ragusa.

Talleyrand introduced the Russian diplomat to several notes prepared for Napoleon. But this was a small, minor detail of cooperation. As Nesselrode wrote, his goal was “to establish direct correspondence with Emperor Alexander through the medium of M. Speransky, who then enjoyed his full confidence.” The adviser to the Russian embassy in Paris was actually “accredited” under the Prince of Benevento. What explained such an extraordinary, exceptional measure? Every month the threat of war between France and Russia became more and more real. The Tsar and his entourage needed to develop a strategic and tactical line in a difficult international situation in Europe and Asia. Talleyrand's experience and knowledge, his extensive information (he also received information from Fouche), his negative attitude towards Napoleon's new aggressive plans, his trusted ties with Alexander - all these circumstances gave special importance to the opinions, assessments, and judgments of the ex-Minister of External Relations. And he was kept under wraps in the most thorough manner. In Nesselrode’s correspondence, Talleyrand hid under the nicknames “Cousin Henri”, “Ta”, “Anna Ivanovna”, “our bookseller”, “lawyer”.

What did Talleyrand recommend to the Tsar? First, “peace with the Porte as quickly as possible and at any cost.” He believed that the protracted war with the Turks tied up the Russian army, undermined Russia’s finances and gave “real benefits only to France.” “Cousin Henri” did not hesitate to use extreme formulations, seeing peace with Turkey as “salvation” for the Russian state.

Secondly, the Prince of Benevento retained his Austrian sympathies. He proposed concluding an Austro-Russian defensive alliance on the following conditions: Russia’s renunciation of claims to Moldavia and Wallachia, the creation of a defensive line running from the Baltic Sea to the borders of Prussia, then through Saxony to Bohemia and Austria. Napoleon's violation of the forbidden zone would mean war with the Austrian and Russian empires.

Thirdly, Talleyrand proposed that Russian diplomacy resolve a number of important issues. Among them: negotiations with England on cooperation and subsidies; "salvation" of Prussia; achieving “confidence” in relations with Sweden; the creation, under the auspices of Russia, of a Polish kingdom opposed to France; waiver of Tilsit's obligations; restoration of trade with all countries.

The “Bookseller” advised “not to show concern,” to show “firmness and courage in all explanations with France,” and to take advantage of the peaceful respite to “become strong.” Talleyrand pointed out the need to strengthen Russian finances and expressed his satisfaction that his ideas in this area were shared in St. Petersburg.

Of course, a special place in Nesselrode’s reports was occupied by the question of the prospects for Russian-French relations. He wrote already in September 1810: “The possibility of war between Russia and France has for some time become the topic of all conversations in Paris.” “Cousin Henri” believed that “a storm will break out more than once while the war in Spain continues,” but at the same time, given Napoleon’s enormous military and material capabilities, he did not exclude the possibility of military operations on two fronts. When asked about the timing of the French attack on Russia, the “cousin” gave an answer very close to the truth: April 1812.

So, noble service to the just cause of protecting Russia from Napoleonic aggression? And no self-interest? No, Taleyran was true to himself. In a personal letter to the Tsar dated September 15, 1810, he asked for one and a half million francs in shares with a vague promise to return this amount “as soon as circumstances change.” From the point of view of court etiquette, this was more than a tactless step. In the same unprecedented document, he asked to transfer money to the banker Bethmann, who was involved in Russian and Austrian financial transactions, and to send a corresponding message to the Russian Consul General in Paris, K. I. Labensky. it was already too much! Reduce His Imperial Majesty to the level of a simple clerk. The unceremonious “cousin” was answered from St. Petersburg with a dry and harsh refusal, and his letter was not burned, but carefully preserved.

Some doors were closed, but the enterprising diplomat tried to enter others. Soon after his unsuccessful appeal to the Tsar, Talleyrand suggested to Nesselrode that he raise the issue of introducing a license for trade with England in St. Petersburg, as the initiator of the continental blockade, Napoleon, had done. Taking care of his interests, the Prince of Benevento would like to be the first to receive several such licenses without indicating the names of the ships and the names of their captains. This modest operation could not, of course, fully compensate for the one and a half million francs that Alexander I refused to pay to Talleyrand.

In St. Petersburg, “Cousin Henri” was not given any money, but his advice was carefully listened to. Perhaps their importance should not be overestimated. But nevertheless, there is no doubt that the actions of Russian diplomacy on many important issues coincided with the proposals of Talleyrand, which were reported to the parish by Nesselrode. The Bucharest Peace Treaty, which put an end to the Russian-Turkish war, was signed on May 28, 1812 as a result of the diplomatic skill of Field Marshal M. I. Kutuzov. Russia received Bessarabia, but returned Moldavia and Wallachia to Turkey. A secret oral agreement was concluded with Austria, according to which it pledged not to conduct active military operations against the Russian army. Prussia limited itself to moving an observation corps to the borders. Sweden became an ally of Russia. Russian-English diplomatic relations were restored. “My diplomacy should have done half the campaign for me (military action against Russia), and she hardly thought about it,” the French emperor complained.

The war with Russia ended with a crushing defeat for Napoleon. "This is the beginning of the end." Such words were attributed to Talleyrand. The course of events fully confirmed them.

Louis XVIII (engraving by Audouin from a drawing by Gros, 1815).

But the peculiar frankness of this predatory hero of Balzac was not characteristic of everyone. And even those bourgeois political figures who tried their best to imitate Talleyrand as an unattainable model, did not cease to revile him behind their backs, watching how this maestro of deceit and the most cynical comedian brilliantly played a completely new role for him on the world stage. Of course, those who were most angry at his serene impudence were his direct opponents, the diplomats of the feudal-absolutist powers, whom he made it his first priority to fool. These diplomats saw that in Vienna he had cleverly snatched their own weapons from them before they came to their senses, and now he was beating them with these weapons, demanding in the name of the “principle of legitimism” and in the name of respect for the “legitimate” dynasty that had returned to France, that not only the French territory remained inviolable, but that Central Europe returned completely to its pre-revolutionary state and that therefore the “legitimate” Saxon king remained with all his old possessions, which were claimed by Prussia.
Talleyrand's opponents were most outraged by the fact that he, who at one time so quickly sold the legitimate monarchy, served the revolution, served Napoleon, shot the Duke of Enghien only for his “legitimate” origin, destroyed and trampled under Napoleon with his seven diplomatic formalities and speeches any semblance of an international rights, every concept of “legitimate” or other rights - now with the most serene look, with the clearest forehead he declared (for example, to the Russian delegate at the Vienna Congress, Karl Vasilyevich Nesselrod): “You are talking to me about a deal - I cannot make deals . I am happy that I cannot be as free in my actions as you are. You are guided by your interests, your will: as for me, I am obliged to follow principles, and principles do not enter into transactions” (les principes ne transigent pas). His opponents simply could not believe their ears when they heard that such harsh speeches were being given and impartial morals were being read to them by the same Prince Talleyrand, who - as the already mentioned newspaper “Le Nain jaune” wrote about him around the same time - spent his whole life selling all those who bought it. Neither Nesselrode, nor the Prussian delegate Humboldt, nor Alexander knew that even in those very days of the Congress of Vienna, when Talleyrand gave them harsh lessons in moral behavior, loyalty to principles and religiously unswerving service to legitimism and legality, he received a bribe from the Saxon king five million francs in gold, from the Duke of Baden - one million; They also did not know that later they would all read in Chateaubriand’s memoirs that for his ardent defense in the name of legitimism of the rights of the Neapolitan Bourbons to the throne of the Two Sicilies, Talleyrand then, in Vienna, received from the pretender Ferdinand IV six million (according to other indications, three million seven hundred thousand) and for the convenience of transferring money he was even so kind and helpful that he sent his personal secretary Perret to Ferdinand.
But even here he acted in the matter of taking bribes exactly as under Napoleon. He did not do things for bribes that would go against the interests of France or, more broadly speaking, with the main diplomatic goals that he sought to achieve. But he simultaneously received money from those who were personally interested in seeing that these goals were achieved as quickly and as completely as possible by Talleyrand. So, France, for example, was directly interested in preventing Prussia from seizing the possessions of the Saxon king, and Talleyrand defended Saxony. But since the Saxon king was much more interested in this than France, this king, in order to stimulate the greatest activity in Talleyrand, gave him, for his part, five million. And Talleyrand took them. And, of course, he took it with the restrained and graceful grandeur that was always characteristic of him, with which he once, in 1807, accepted a bribe from this same Saxon king to convince Napoleon not to take the Sistine Madonna and others from the Dresden Gallery, as if it were bad luck paintings that the emperor liked.
The return of Napoleon from the island of Elba and the restoration of the empire took Talleyrand completely by surprise. Recently (in May 1933) Ferdinand Bak's fantasy book “Le secret de Talleyrand” was published in Paris. This “secret”, revealed only by Buck, is that Talleyrand... himself arranged Napoleon’s escape from Elba. I note this amateurish fantasy book here only as a curiosity to prove that distant posterity continues to consider Talleyrand capable of the most amazingly cunning plan and dexterous and strong enough to carry out any such project. Needless to say, there is not even a shadow of scientific argumentation in this book.

Wellington (lithograph by Charles Besnier).

Having restored the empire in March 1815, Napoleon let Talleyrand know that he would take him back into service. But Talleyrand remained in Vienna; he did not believe either in the merciful disposition of the emperor (who immediately ordered the sequestration of all the prince’s property upon his widow’s accession), or in the strength of the new Napoleonic reign. The Congress of Vienna was closed. Waterloo broke out, and the Bourbons, and with them Talleyrand, returned to France again. Circumstances were such that it was not yet possible for Louis XVIII to get rid of Talleyrand, whom he did not like and was afraid of. Moreover: Fouche, Duke of Otranto, about whom it was said that if Talleyrand had not been in the world, he would have been the most deceitful and vicious man of all mankind, this same Fouche, with a number of clever maneuvers, achieved that even him, at least for the first time time, but still had to be invited to the new cabinet, although Fouché was among those members of the Convention who voted for the execution of Louis XVI in 1793.
These two people, Talleyrand and Fouche, both former clergy, both accepted the revolution to make a career for themselves, both ministers of the Directory, both ministers of Napoleon, both received the ducal title from Napoleon, both earned a million-dollar fortune under Napoleon, both betrayed Napoleon - and now they also entered together into the office of the “most Christian” and “legitimate” monarch, the brother of the executed Louis. Fouché and Talleyrand already knew each other well and that is why they sought above all to work with each other. Despite the very great similarity of both in the sense of deep contempt for anything other than personal interests, a complete lack of integrity and any restraining principles in the implementation of their plans, they differed from one another in many ways. Fouche was not a very timid man, and before the 9th of Thermidor he boldly put his head on the line, organizing an attack on Robespierre and his overthrow in the Convention. For Talleyrand such behavior would have been completely unthinkable. Fouche, during the era of terror, acted in Lyon in a way that Talleyrand would never have dared to act, who emigrated precisely because he believed that remaining in the camp of “neutrals” was very dangerous in the present, and being an active fighter against the counter-revolution would become dangerous in the future. Fouche had a good head, after Talleyrand - the best that Napoleon ever had. The emperor knew this, showered them both with favors, but then put them in disgrace. That’s why he often remembered them together. For example, after abdicating the throne, he expressed regret that he did not have time to hang Talleyrand and Fouche. “I leave this matter to the Bourbons,” the emperor reportedly added.
However, the Bourbons, willy-nilly, immediately after Waterloo and after their second return to the throne in the summer of 1815, had to not only refrain from hanging both dukes, both Benevento and Otranto, but also call them to rule France. A poet and ideologist of the noble-clerical reaction at that moment, Chateaubriand could not hide his rage at the sight of these two leaders of the revolution and empire, one of whom bore the blood of Louis XVI and many others executed at Lyons, and the other the blood of the Duke of Enghien. Chateaubriand was at court when the lame Talleyrand, arm in arm with Fouche, walked into the king’s office: “Suddenly the door opens; Vice silently enters, leaning on Crime - Monsieur Talleyrand, supported by Monsieur Fouche; a hellish vision slowly passes before me, enters the king’s office and disappears there.”

II

In this ministry, in which Talleyrand was chairman of the council of ministers and Fouche the minister of police, Napoleonic general Gouvion Saint-Cyr became minister of war; There were other similar appointments. Talleyrand clearly saw that the Bourbons could hold on only if, giving up all their grievances, they accepted the revolution and the empire as an inescapable and enormous historical fact and abandoned dreams of the old regime. But he soon saw something else no less clearly: namely, that neither the royal brother and heir Charles, nor the children of this Charles, nor the whole cloud of emigrants who returned to France would ever agree with such a policy, that they “forgot nothing and did not learned” (Talleyrand’s famous saying about the Bourbons, often incorrectly attributed to Alexander I). He saw that at court a party of enraged and irreconcilable noble and clerical reactionaries was gaining the upper hand, under the rule of the absurd, unfulfillable dream of destroying everything done during the revolution and retained by Napoleon, that is, in other words, they want the conversion of a country that has embarked on the path commercial and industrial development, to the country of the feudal-noble monarchy. Talleyrand understood that this dream was completely impossible to achieve, that these ultra-royalists could rage as they pleased, but that they could seriously begin to break the new France, to break the institutions, orders, civil and criminal laws left over from the revolution and from Napoleon, even just to raise this question openly - perhaps only by finally going crazy. However, he soon began to see that the ultra-royalists really seemed to be going completely crazy - at least, they were losing even that little caution that they had shown back in 1814.
The fact is that the sudden return of Napoleon in March 1815, his hundred-day reign and his new overthrow - again carried out not by France, but exclusively by the new invasion of the allied European armies - all these stunning events brought the noble-clerical reaction out of its final equilibrium . They felt severely insulted. How could an unarmed man, in the complete tranquility of the country, land on the southern coast of France and in three weeks, continuously moving towards Paris, without firing a single shot, without shedding a drop of blood, conquer France from its “legitimate” king, drive this king abroad, again sit on the throne and again gather a huge army for war with all of Europe? Who was this man? A despot who did not take off his arms throughout his reign, who devastated the country with conscription, a usurper who took no account of anyone or anything in the world, and most importantly, a monarch, whose new accession would inevitably immediately cause a new, endless war with Europe. And at the feet of this man, without talking, without attempts at resistance, even without attempts at persuasion on his part, in March 1815, all of France, the entire peasantry, the entire army, the entire bourgeoisie immediately fell.
Not a single hand was raised to defend the “legitimate” king, to defend the Bourbon dynasty that returned in 1814. To explain this phenomenon with the fear for the land acquired during the revolution, which the peasantry had, with those fears of the specter of the resurrection of the noble system, which were experienced not only by the peasantry, but also by the bourgeoisie, in general, to explain this amazing incident, these “Hundred Days” in some general and deep way For social reasons, the ultra-royalists were not able to, and simply did not want to. They attributed everything that happened precisely to excessive weakness, compliance, inappropriate liberalism on the part of the king, in the first year of his reign, from April 1814 to March 1815: if only then, they assured, they had managed to mercilessly exterminate sedition - such a general and sudden “treason” would have been impossible in March 1815, and Napoleon would have been captured immediately after his landing at Cape Juan. Now to this shame of the expulsion of the Bourbons in March was added the shame of their return in June, July and August, after Waterloo, and this time really “in the wagons” of the army of Wellington and Blucher. The fury of the ultra-royalists knew no bounds. If the king resisted them a little more and if they still allowed him to resist, then this was only at the first moment: after all, it was necessary to look around, more surprises could be expected.
This is the only reason why a government with Talleyrand and Fouche at its head became possible. But as more and more armies of the British, Prussians, then the Austrians, and later the Russians poured into France, as the enemy armies, this time for many years, were positioned to occupy entire departments and to fully provide Louis XVIII and his dynasty from new attempts by Napoleon, as well as from any revolutionary attempts - the extreme reaction decisively raised its head and screamed about merciless revenge, about the execution of traitors, about the suppression and destruction of everything that was hostile to the old dynasty .
Talleyrand understood where these follies would lead. And he even made some attempts to restrain the frantic. For a long time he resisted the compilation of a proscription list of those who contributed to the return and new accession of Napoleon. These persecutions were nonsense, because all of France either actively contributed or did not resist the emperor and thereby also contributed to him. But then Fute stepped up. Having guillotined or drowned hundreds and hundreds of Lyons in the Rhone in 1793 for their adherence to the House of Bourbon, at the same time voting for the death of Louis XVI, for years under Napoleon, as Minister of Police, shooting people accused, again, of adherence to the House of Bourbon - Fouche, again a minister The police, now, in 1815, ardently insisted on new executions, but this time for insufficient commitment to the House of Bourbon. Fouche hastened to compile a list of the most, in his opinion, guilty dignitaries, generals and private individuals, who primarily helped the second accession of Napoleon.
Talleyrand protested strongly. The narrow police mind of Fouche and the furious vindictiveness of the royal court triumphed over the more far-sighted policy of Talleyrand, who understood how much the dynasty was ruining itself, getting dirty in the blood of such people as, for example, the famous Marshal Ney, the legendary brave man, the favorite of the entire army, the hero of the Battle of Borodino. Talleyrand managed to save only forty-three people, the remaining fifty-seven remained on Fouche's list. The execution of Marshal Ney took place and, of course, became the most rewarding topic for anti-Bourbon agitation in the army and throughout the country.
This was just the beginning. A wave of “white terror,” as this movement was then called (for the first time in history), swept across France, especially in the south. The terrible beatings of revolutionaries and Bonapartists, and at the same time also Protestants (Huguenots), incited by the Catholic clergy, irritated Talleyrand, and he tried to enter into a fight with them, but he was not destined to remain in power for long.

Talleyrand. (From a drawing by Filippoto)

Street fighting in Paris during the revolution of 1830 (Lithograph by Victor Adam)

A Talleyrand-like policy was needed, but not done through the hands of Talleyrand. Talleyrand did not want to notice that he himself was hated even more than Fouche, that the majority of ultra-royalists (and the majority in all other parties) willingly repeated the words of Joseph de Maistre: “Of these two people, Talleyrand is more criminal than Fouche.” If Fouche was extra ballast for Talleyrand, then Talleyrand himself was extra ballast for King Louis XVIII. That is why Fouche had not yet left for Dresden when Talleyrand, who had sent him away, found himself thrown overboard. Upon his retirement, he received the court title of Grand Chamberlain, with a salary of one hundred thousand francs in gold per year and with the “obligation” to do whatever he wanted and live where he pleased. He, however, also had this very title under Napoleon (along with all his other ranks and titles), and under Napoleon these duties were just as little burdensome and were even more generously paid.
Freed from the ministry, Talleyrand began to work closely on an operation he had long thought out, about which no one knew until recent years, more precisely until December 15, 1933, when some secret documents were published in France. On January 12, 1817, Prince Talleyrand, it turns out, wrote a most secret letter to Metternich, Chancellor of the Austrian Empire. He reported that he had “taken away” (emport?) from the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs some of Napoleon’s original correspondence, starting with the conqueror’s return from Egypt and ending with 1813. So, would you like to buy it?
A correspondence began between the seller and the buyer. Talleyrand wrote that Russia, or Prussia, or England would give half a million francs in gold, but he, Talleyrand, loves Austria and, in particular, Metternich. The goods are first-class: “twelve voluminous bags”, Napoleon’s own signatures! And most importantly, Emperor Franz should not skimp because there are things there that are unpleasant for Austria, and, having bought the documents, the Austrian government - as Talleyrand advises - “could either bury them in the depths of their archives or even destroy them.” The deal took place, and Talleyrand sold these archival documents that he personally stole for half a million. He stole them in advance, in 1814 and 1815, when he briefly visited twice at the head of the government.
But, realizing quite clearly that he was committing real high treason, coupled with direct criminality, theft of state property, Prince Talleyrand prudently demands from Metternich that he, Talleyrand, be provided with shelter in Austria if, for example, some kind of crime befalls him in France. some trouble and he will have to leave his fatherland without loss of time.
Metternich agreed to everything and paid for everything in full. And only later, when all this stolen property was taken out of France (under the guise of Austrian embassy papers that were not subject to inspection) and arrived in Vienna, the Austrian chancellor could be convinced that the seller had partly deceived him too: many of the documents turned out to be not originals at all, but copies, without Napoleon's signature. But in such delicate cases, who will you complain to? The concealer and buyer always runs the risk of suffering if the thief and dealer is prone to deceit. That was the end of the matter.

III

Talleyrand retired to private life. Enormous wealth, a magnificent castle in Valence, a magnificent palace in the city, the royal luxury of life - this is what awaited him at the end of his days. Idleness did not weigh heavily on him. He never liked work at all. He gave guidance to his subordinates in the ministry, to his ambassadors, and finally to his ministers when he was first minister. He gave advice to the sovereigns he served - Napoleon, Louis XVIII; did this in intimate, face-to-face conversations. He conducted his diplomatic negotiations and intrigues sometimes at the dinner table, sometimes at a ball, sometimes during a break in a card game; he achieved the main results precisely under different circumstances of the secular, entertainment-filled life that he always led.
But the thorny, daily, bureaucratic work was unknown and unnecessary to him. For this purpose, there was a staff of experienced dignitaries and officials subordinate to him, secretaries and directors. Now, in retirement, just as in the years of his disgrace under Napoleon, he carefully watched the political chessboard and the moves of his partners, but for the time being he himself did not take part in the game. And he saw that the Bourbons continued to undermine their position, that the only man with a head among them, Louis XVIII, was exhausted in his unsuccessful struggle against the extreme reactionaries, that when the king died, a frivolous old man, Charles d'Artois, who did not only he will not resist the plans for restoring the old regime, but he will also willingly take the initiative, because he does not have the intelligence to understand the terrible danger of this hopeless game, this absurd and impossible reversal of history, he will not even have that instinct of self-preservation, which alone prevented his older brother Louis XVIII was quite likely to join the ultra-royalists.
Having retreated from active politics, Talleyrand sat down to write his memoirs. He wrote five volumes (available in an abridged Russian translation). From a purely biographical point of view, these five volumes are of almost no interest to us. Let us say here only a few words about this work by Talleyrand.
Memoirs of bourgeois figures, who played a very primary role, are rarely truthful. This is very understandable: the author, aware of his historical responsibility, strives to construct his story so that the motivation for his own actions is as exalted as possible, and where they cannot be interpreted in any way in favor of the author, one can try to completely renounce complicity in them. In a word, about many memoirists of this type, one can repeat what Henri Rochefort once said about the memoirs of the first minister of the end of the Second Empire, Emile Olivier: “Olivier lies as if he were still the first minister.” The best of the newest examples of this kind of literature can serve as nine volumes of memoirs of the late Poincaré (another dozen and a half were being prepared, judging by the accepted scale and the well-known diligence of the author). All nine volumes of Poincaré are almost an oversight, essentially a repetition of the patriotic bureaucracy published during the era of several of his ministries and his presidency.

The reputations of both Tylerant, who “sold everyone who bought him,” and Joseph Fouché, who rose from seemingly the most left-wing of the Jacobins to a millionaire awarded by Napoleon the title of Duke of Otranto, minister of police for the empire and the restored Bourbons, were firmly established. And it is unlikely that anyone will be able to shake it, although attempts of this kind are made from time to time in historical literature. But the question of the correct assessment of the historical meaning of their activities is not as simple as it might initially seem. One might think that with their unenviable reputations, Talleyrand and Fouché somehow sharply deviated from the “norm” of behavior of the politicians of that time. Was this really so? After all, there is no doubt that adherence to principles was by no means a quality that allowed not only to safely survive during the numerous swings of the political pendulum to the right and left, but also to maintain fairly high positions and power under successive regimes. The revolutionaries who survived the 9th Thermidor and did not allow themselves to be drawn into the orgy of acquisition and looting under the Directory, who did not want to put up with the 18th Brumaire, were awaited by the guillotine, exile to Cayenne, where tropical fever was rampant (the “yellow guillotine”), prison, and, at best, complete exclusion from political life. No one was able to preserve position and influence and preserve principles. In relation to Lazare Carnot, who claimed this, Engels ironically remarked: “Where has it been seen that an honest man managed to hold out as he did despite Thermidor, Fructidor, Brumaire, etc.”1. If measured by these standards, then Talleyrand and Foucher were distinguished from their colleagues only by greater strength of mind, greater foresight, dexterity and shamelessness, greater ability to benefit from political changes, to make themselves necessary for each new regime. And among all these qualities, the main one, of course, was the state mind and its obligatory property - vision beyond the present day, in a word, political insight, which did not cease to be such because it was entirely placed in the service of personal egoistic benefits. For all their outward differences, the arrogant representative of one of the most noble aristocratic families of France, and the nosy police sleuth, a native of the very bottom of the bourgeoisie, were surprisingly similar in the main and because of this they hated each other. Talleyrand, hinting at Fouché's attempts to expand the police's curiosity beyond its limits, remarked:
- The Minister of Police is a person who first intervenes in what concerns him, and then in what does not concern him.
Hearing the remark that Fouche despises people, the prince said in passing:
- Undoubtedly, this man has studied himself well.
Fouché did not remain in debt:
- There is room in the Temple prison to place Talleyrand there at the right moment.
And suddenly, at the height of Napoleon's Spanish campaign, the enemies were reconciled (through the mediation of their mutual acquaintance d'Hautrives). The latent opposition of Talleyrand and Fouche to Napoleon, which united these highest and most capable dignitaries of the empire as allies, was dictated by their political foresight. It was not generated by either disfavor of the emperor (which was a consequence, and not the cause, of the secret machinations of his most intelligent and insightful ministers), nor their personal hostility towards him. Fouche and Talleyrand could neither seriously count on benefiting from the fall of the emperor, nor lay claim to first place in state. All their actions ultimately boiled down to one thing - to obtain guarantees for themselves in the event of the fall of Napoleon, which he himself made probable due to his unbridled aggressive policy, which became, as it were, an inevitable companion to his personal dictatorship. At the same time, not even special mind to understand that the worst prospect for both Talleyrand and Fouché was the restoration of the Bourbons, no matter how much these former active participants in the revolution flirted with the royalist emissaries. In this respect, they were both representatives of a fairly broad, albeit amorphous, group, which included both the upper and middle echelons of the Napoleonic administration. This group believed that any regime that might replace the empire should be in a certain continuity with the revolution in order to guarantee the inviolability of the new bourgeois order and, of course, the place in political life of those who personified these orders. As a result, purely selfish interest powerfully dictated to people like Talleyrand and Fouche the search for an alternative to the Napoleonic regime that would better satisfy the thirst for stability in bourgeois France. And greater stability could be achieved if the new regime abandoned its adventurist foreign policy and could establish peace, preserving what could actually be retained for a long time from the gains of previous years. “I cannot,” Napoleon wrote to Taleyrand in September 1806, “have any of the great powers of Europe as an ally.”2
Talleyrand understood that Napoleon's victories only narrowed the possibilities of French diplomacy to play on the contradictions between the great powers. When news arrived of the defeat of the Prussians at Jena and Auerstedt, a significant phrase came out of the mouth of the imperial minister: “They do not deserve any regret, but Europe perishes with them.” If before 1806 Talleyran saw a danger to the political stability of France in the possible death of Napoleon on the battlefield or at the hands of an assassin, then from that time on Napoleon himself with his unrestrained plans of conquest seemed to be the main threat to the prince. Fouche, the newly-minted Duke of Otranto, came to the same conclusions. One can agree with one of his newest (and generally apologetic) biographers when he writes about Napoleonic police minister: “He realized that France urgently needed peace to consolidate the great gains obtained as a result of the French Revolution.”3 Talleyrand, earlier and better than others, was able to discern what the interests of the new, bourgeois France were and defended them when they corresponded to his personal interests. They coincided, of course, not always, but still quite often. Prince Talleyrand understood that neglecting the interests of the bourgeoisie, even if it was beneficial at the moment, could result in a big loss in the future. Therefore, he always sought to find a solution in which his personal benefits coincided with French interests, as they were understood by the new rising class.
In March 1805, Talleyrand, in the presence of the emperor, made a speech in the Senate regarding the upcoming proclamation of Napoleon as king of Italy. In this speech, the prince expressed disagreement with the comparisons of Napoleon with Charlemagne and Alexander the Great that were often made at that time: “Empty and deceptive analogies! Charlemagne was a conqueror, not the founder of a state... Alexander, constantly pushing the limits of his conquests, prepared for himself only a bloody funeral.” On the contrary, Napoleon, as Talleyrand explains, “seeks only to establish the ideas of order in France, and the ideas of peace in Europe.” Addressing the emperor directly, Talleyran proclaimed: “For France and Italy, you are dear as a legislator and defender of their rights and power. Europe honors you as the guardian of its interests...”4. When a war broke out with the Third Coalition, the immediate cause of which was the annexation of Genoa to France and the formation of the Kingdom of Italy - in contradiction with the Treaties of Amiens and Luneville, Talleyrand declared in the Senate on September 23, 1805: the emperor sees himself forced to repel "the unjust aggression which he has vainly tried to prevent it." At the same time, even on the eve of Austerlitz (at least Talleyrand argued so in 1807), he offered Napoleon such a “moderate” program: the establishment of “religion, morality and order in France,” peaceful relations with England, strengthening the eastern borders by creating the Confederation of the Rhine , the transformation of Italy into a state independent of Austria and France, the creation of Poland as a barrier against tsarist Russia. And even after Austerlitz, Talleyrand persistently recommended to Napoleon reconciliation with Austria and the conclusion of a close alliance with it. The prince did not approve of the cruelty of the conditions of the Peace of Pressburg. He joked: “I always have to negotiate not with Europe, but with Bonaparte!”
In the fall of 1808, having returned to Paris after the Erfurt meeting of the two emperors - Napoleon and Alexander I - Talleyrand made it clear to the Austrian ambassador K. Metternich: it was in the interests of France itself that the powers opposing Napoleon unite and put a limit to his insatiable ambition. The prince explained that Napoleon's cause is no longer the matter of France, that Europe can only be saved by a close union of Austria and Russia. Arriving in Vienna in 1809 after the break with France, Metternich literally reproduced the words dictated to him by Talleyrand: “France has not waged war since the Peace of Luneville (1801 - Author). They are led by Napoleon, using French resources."5 (And almost simultaneously, Talleyrand wrote to Napoleon: “Your Majesty was absent for thirty days and added six victories to the amazing history of his previous campaigns... Your glory, sir, is our pride, but our very existence depends on your life.”) On the eve of the campaign 1812, Talleyrand summed up the results: “Napoleon preferred that his adventures be named after him, and not his century”6.
The die was finally cast. In March 1814, Talleyrand and the Prince-Primate of the Confederation of the Rhine, Karl Dahlberg, who acted together with him, sent their agent Baron de Vitrolles through Switzerland to the Allied camp. And as proof that Vitrolle was who he claimed to be, Dahlberg told him the names of two Viennese ladies, whose favor he shared with the Tsarist diplomat Nesselrode. The password turned out to be convincing. And Talleyrand's advice, transmitted through Vitrolle, was to not conduct any further negotiations with Napoleon, to move straight to Paris and restore the Bourbon dynasty on the throne of France. The last part of the recommendation, of course, cannot be considered an example of political insight, but at that moment it seemed to the prince most consistent with his personal benefits and careerist calculations. After his abdication, while on Elba, Napoleon once remarked:
- If I had hanged two - Talleyrand and Fouche - I would still remain on the throne.
- Oh, poor Napoleon! - Talleyrand ironically commented on this tirade. “Instead of hanging me, he should have listened to my advice.” Napoleon's main traitor was himself.

Fouche and Talleyrand in Viennese. Vivos voco: a.a. Egorov, "Minister of Napoleonic Police Fouche." Again, closer, the sounds of “Carmagnola” appear.

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Lyubimov, Isidor Evstigneevich: biography

Fouche and Talleyrand in Viennese